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Tracks, intersections and dead ends
Multicultural challenges to state feminism in Denmark and
Norway
BIRTE SIIM
Aalborg University, Denmark
HEGE SKJEIE
University of Oslo, Norway
ABSTRACT This article discusses multicultural challenges to state feminism in
Denmark and Norway, focusing both on similarities and differences in the two
countries policy responses. In spite of important differences, we point towards similar
problems and dilemmas in the public responses to multiculturalism and diversity
among women connected to a state feminist agenda that in both countries has been
rather one-sided in its conception of what women-friendliness may imply. The first
part of the paper expands on institutional ‘tracks’: (Variations in) state feminist
traditions, in religious traditions, and in the inclusion of organizations of civil society
in political power. The second part explores the framing of the hijab as a political
issue of ‘intersections’ of gender equality versus religious belongings. The third part
investigates what we see as a ‘dead end’ in policy making to prevent violations of
women’s rights; that is the general, age based, restrictions on family unification as a
means to combat forced marriages. Finally, we emphasise the importance of partici-
patory women-friendly politics that include all who are affected by political decisions.
KEY WORDS forced and arranged marriages ● gender equality ● immigration ●
integration ● multiculturalism ● religious dress ● state feminism
INTRODUCTION
In policy discourses across Europe, the ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ is increas-
ingly tied to gender equality concerns, which have come to the forefront of
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European political debates on immigration and integration in recent years.
A delimited, explicitly minority group related, gender equality agenda is
developing, which aims to counter violations of women’s individual rights.
Policies adopted within a ‘crisis’ frame encompass a series of new state
initiatives to combat honour based violence, genital mutilation, forced
marriages, ‘limping’ divorces. But a ‘crisis’ frame may even include
measures which actually limit, rather than enhance, individual rights, as
when restrictions on the use of religious dress in public settings are
portrayed as necessary to counter, in particular, gender hierarchies within
Islam.
Crisis awareness is generally raised in combinations of lobbying and
dramatic media coverage of individual stories of suffering, which in turn
place demands on the political system to act more systematically to prevent
violations of women’s rights. It is, however, remarkable how these new
policies, in both Norway and Denmark, are set apart from traditionally
broad gender equality agendas, and largely remains contained within a
‘crisis’ frame. Comparably little public attention has, in both countries, been
paid to traditionally important democratic issues of political participation
and representation. Such issues are not totally absent from public agendas.
But there seems to be a hierarchical ordering of the new gender equality
agenda which then runs counter to what is otherwise claimed to be a strong
state feminist tradition in both countries.
This tradition highlights the similarities of the two national gender
equality regimes, which are founded on high levels of education and labour
market participation, extensive public child care, relatively generous
maternity/paternity policies, a comparatively strong gender equality legis-
lation, plus high levels of political participation and inclusion into state
political institutions, in some cases supported by institutional regulations of
gender balance. In the original formulation, such traits were conceptualized
as expressions of a state potential to develop ‘women-friendly’ societies
(Hernes, 1987). In international feminist scholarship, references to ‘state
feminism’ have now mainly come to refer to a form of institutionalized
bureaucracy in charge of creating and implementing gender equality policies
(Outshoorn and Kantola, 2007). However, the original formulations rather
depict an inclusion dynamic, where mobilization ‘from below’ – i.e. through
social and feminist movements, combines with ‘integration politics from
above’ – i.e. party political elites and institutions, to create state initiatives
where rights’ expansion and institutional presence are two sides of the same
coin. In this sense, state feminism mainly refers to the forms of participation
which shape gender equality policies, and – in its first, visionary, formulation
– the possible development towards a truly women-friendly society.
More recently, the concept of state feminism has been heavily criticized
both for its reliance on a particular, social democratic inspired, idealized
‘participatory corporatism’ (Holst, 2002), and also, for cultivating a kind of
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unified Nordic exceptionalism, which is largely blind to diversities within its
own state orders and thus homogenizes conceptions of women’s interests
(Borchorst and Siim, 2002). Here we address this critique mainly from
‘within’ the participatory dimension of state feminism. We do not wish to
idealize ‘participatory state feminism’ per se. But we think that an obvious
political challenge is today posed by the relative absence of people from
ethnic minority backgrounds in the decision making structures of the state,
on the national levels where gender equality policies are formalized (Skjeie
and Teigen, 2007). This largely holds true whether we refer to the ‘numeri-
cal’ or to the ‘corporate’ channel of power and influence in society (c.f.
Rokkan, 1989 [1967]). Important differences can also be observed within
the political systems in the two countries under consideration here. But it
still seems clear that there is no comparable strong dynamic operating to
include minority based locations, voices and points of views in national
decision making bodies. This way, there is clearly limited space for diverse
conceptions of fair and adequate policy formation within the current frame
work of policy making.
In our opinion, this shortcoming has left the field more open to interven-
tions which regard the formation of a delimited, minority group specific,
gender equality agenda as the main responsibility of the majority. It opens
scope for radical dichotomized versions of the liberal gender equality values
as opposed to the patriarchal traditions of ‘immigrant culture’, and then
mainly, as an argument for new restrictions on immigration (for instance
Storhaug, 2006). As in other European countries, the radical right parties in
Norway and Denmark have also contributed to build, and then capitalized
on, this new selective gender equality agenda, while paying little attention
to the more traditional ones (c.f. Roggeband and Verloo, 2007; Akkerman
and Hagelund, 2007).1
However, we can also observe important differences in the content of
substantive policy-making in the two countries under consideration here. In
this article, we highlight differences in legal regulations and policy discourse
on two of the issues that loom large on the new, delimited, gender equality
agenda: policies against forced marriages, and policies on religious dress.
Danish policies on forced marriages are marked by the controversial ‘24
year’ rule on family unification. In Norway, similar plans for a ‘21 year’ rule
have recently been abandoned. Similarly, while there are no general restric-
tions, or blanket bans, on the use of religious dress in public settings in either
Denmark or Norway, a recent Supreme Court decision in Denmark rules
that employers still, under certain conditions, are allowed to ban hijabs in
the work place. In Norway, the Gender Equality Ombud has, on the other
hand, found hijab bans in violation of the general prohibition against
indirect gender discrimination.
In this paper, we argue that such developments reflect important differ-
ences not only in the general political climate, or in the relative importance
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of radical right parties on governmental policies in the two countries, but
also differences in actual state feminist traditions and somewhat divergent
patterns of ‘participatory corporatism’. Not least important is the concur-
rent tradition of official religious pluralist policies which to a larger extent
in Norway aims to include also ethno-religious organizations (cf. Modood,
2000) in corporate structures of dialogue about policy making.
We further claim that there are similar problems and dilemmas in the
public responses to multiculturalism and diversity among women connected
to a state feminist agenda that in both countries has been rather one-sided
in its conceptions of what women-friendliness may imply.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part expands on what we
see as institutional ‘tracks’: (Variations in) state feminist traditions, in
religious pluralist policies, and in the inclusion of organisations of civil
society in corporatist arrangements. The second part explores the hijab as
an issue of ‘intersections’; whether, and how, public debate, legal regulations
and court decisions frame the religious headscarf in terms of gender
equality and religious belongings. The third part investigates what we would
deem to be a ‘dead end’ in policy making to prevent violations of women’s
rights; that is the general, age based, restrictions on family unification as a
means to combat forced marriages. Finally, in the conclusion, we emphasize
the importance of public measures aimed at equalizing participation, repre-
sentation and influence in both of the ‘standard’ channels that provide
access to national political decision making institutions: the numerical as
well as the corporate.
INSTITUTIONAL TRACKS
Economic independence on the one hand, and equal political presence on
the other, are twin aspects of the traditional gender equality agenda in both
Norway and Denmark. To a large degree, gender equality policies have also
been based on a shared family model of ‘dual breadwinners’, and have
developed within a similar welfare state context marked by pervasive
cooperation and policy diffusion processes (Borchorst and Dahlerup, 2003;
c.f. Langvasbråten, 2008). But while Norwegian gender equality policies
also show a strong preference towards formalized gender balance regu-
lations as means to redistribute power and influence, Danish gender
equality policies contain no similarly strong institutionalization of gender
balance politics. In Norway, the majority of parties have adopted statutes
that specify 40–60 min.-max. regulations for party political offices and
nominations. Laws regulate the composition of public – both state and
municipal – boards and commissions, and most recently, similar min. max.
legal regulations have been adopted with regard to the composition of the
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boards of all major public and privately owned companies. In Denmark, the
parties to the left formerly practised a system of gender balance politics,
which was abolished in the 1990s. There is no similar tradition for gender
balance regulations across the party spectrum, and only very weak rules to
promote equal participation on public boards and commissions. The
inclusion of women in party political elites has therefore taken place mainly
without formal regulations. And the relative strong presence within parlia-
mentary politics has not been followed by an equally strong presence in
corporate bodies. In this respect, there have been clear limits to diffusion,
both within and across countries.
While ‘integration’ remains the central formal goal of minority oriented
policies in both countries, the definition of the term has changed signifi-
cantly in recent years. Originally launched as an alternative to ‘assimilation’,
it implied a double set of expectations – integration would allow people to
preserve cultural identities and traditions, while enjoying the same possi-
bilities, rights and duties to participate in society, that is in ‘education, work
and organisations’ (Djuve and Fridberg, 2004, cited in Langvasbråten,
2008). The shift in Norwegian integration rhetoric and practices has been
from a predominantly group oriented focus in the 1970s to a stronger
emphasis on individual duties to participate in society and conform to state
bound norms and values (Brochmann, 2002). In terms of political partici-
pation, the emphasis is clearly more on ‘duties’ than on ‘opportunities’.
There is little, if any, diffusion from formalized gender balance politics to
equally formalized minority sensitive political recruitment practices. It is
remarkable how little political attention there has been with regard to a
development of participatory structures which might counter the near total
absence of people from ethnic minorities in, for instance, national parlia-
mentary politics. While elective rights in local, municipal, elections are
granted in both Norway and Denmark also on a formal non-citizenship
basis, and representation issues rank higher on (some) local agendas, central
measures to promote political integration have otherwise mainly been
contained within policies which encourage minority based cultural and
interest group organising (Skjeie and Teigen, 2007).
In Denmark, where policy developments have been described as moving
from liberal pluralism to communitarian assimilationism (Hedetoft, 2004;
Mouritzen, 2006), ideas about ‘national’ values and norms clearly constitute
a more prominent part of the political debate, where much emphasis is
placed on duties to conform to what is explicitly framed as ‘Danish’ values.
Norwegian authorities also tend, if mainly implicitly, to distinguish more
clearly between ‘cultural’ and religious pluralism, and to treat claims based
on the platform of religious pluralism as non-controversial also when they
involve group rights.
The official Danish integration policies have since the victory of the
Liberal-Conservative Government in November 2001 been dependant on
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the Right wing anti-migration party, the Danish People’s Party, for parlia-
mentary support. As a result, the restrictive approach to immigration is
increasingly combined with punitive integration policies. This has had
dramatic effects on the regulation of family unification. Governments have
turned to immigration laws and used the issue of forced marriages to
legitimize a stricter immigration control in relation to family members
symbolized in the infamous ‘24-year rule’ (Grøndahl, 2003). Therefore, the
Danish political debate about immigration has, since the 1990s, been
described as tending to polarize citizens in ideological groups: more cosmo-
politan orientations focus on global concerns, multicultural issues and
recognition politics on the one hand, and a more nationalistic orientation
which focuses on the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’, anti-immigration and
social cohesion (Thomsen, 2006).
A comparative study focusing on parliamentary debates that specifically
address the government’s gender equality policies, also shows how these
consistently provide a setting where politicians express concern about the
conflict between minority cultural traditions and ‘Danish’ equality norms
(Langvasbråten, 2008). To give but one example, from the gender equality
action plan of 2003: ‘Women and men settling in Denmark are to realize
that gender equality is an essential part of Danish society and a core value’
(cited in Langvasbråten, 2008). Similarly, Annette Borchorst (2004) has
described political debates on gender equality as mainly informed by a
claim of Danish citizens having now realized the fully gender-equal society.
As of today, in Danish political rhetoric dominated by the liberal-conserv-
ative government, the ‘equality project’ is mainly claimed to be of relevance
to ‘Muslim countries’, or to immigrant minority groups now living in
Denmark (Andreassen, 2005, for a parallel description of rhetorical shifts
in Dutch politics; see also Roggeband and Verloo, 2007).
Arguably, a parallel ‘national values’ discourse has been contained
more at the fringes of Norwegian political debate. This claim is complicated
by the fact that references to national values loom large in the political
rhetoric of the radical right Progress Party, which also is one of the largest
Norwegian political parties. This party has however, so far, been kept
outside any government coalition. Instead, Norwegian authorities, under
mainly Christian democratic – conservative coalitions in office from roughly
the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s – have concentrated their attention on ‘crisis
prevention’ efforts – producing a series of so called ‘governmental action
plans’ which either aim to prevent forced marriages or violent practices of
female genital mutilation. Such problems have not, however, been
addressed within a broader scope of state initiatives to combat ‘violence in
close relationships’, which also has been a prominent issue on the public
agenda in recent years (c.f. Bredal, 2005). In the Norwegian context, policies
are thus rather marked by segmentation into, on the one hand ‘minority
group’, on the other hand, ‘majority’ concerns. Not surprisingly then,
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minority women’s organizations have observed that their influence on
public policies is often informally based, and furthermore, mainly limited to
such ‘crisis’ issues (Predelli, 2003).
In Norway, four different types of public funding are available to organiz-
ations; subsidies to ‘certified’ national minority-political organizations – of
which three of a total of nine have an explicit gender focus, subsidies to local
immigrant organizations, funding for local voluntary based projects, and
finally, the system of public funding per memberships for all registered
communities of faith. Religious based organising has increased dramatically
during the last decade, and religion now forms the single most important
basis for immigrant organizing in Norway. Mainly, these are Islamic
religious communities, and many are members of the umbrella organization
of the Islamic Council in Norway. Increasingly, the Islamic Council also acts
as ‘liaison’ in new forms of corporatist inspired contacts with public auth-
orities, under the umbrella heading of ‘religious dialogue’. Otherwise, a
clearer cut corporatist, government appointed, commission has the stated
purpose to act as an official link between the authorities and the immigrant
population (this is also actually the commission’s name: KIM2 – The contact
commission between authorities and immigrants).
In Denmark, the main political attempt to increase the participation of
immigrants in public administration and local politics have been through
the Integration Councils that were set up following the first Integration Law
in 1998. Their effects have, however, been ambiguous. The democratic
aspects were limited because they were only consultative, and since the
municipalities could decide the composition of the Integration Councils,
their influence was dependent on the local context (Togeby, 2003). Today,
the decision to establish an Integration Council or not is left to the munic-
ipalities. Otherwise, the main initiatives to promote participation among
immigrant groups are through public support for voluntary associations in
civil society. Comparative Nordic research notes that the Norwegian model
is more clear cut corporatist, as it also has encouraged the formation of
national minority-political organizations, whereas the Danish model has
relied more on local ethnonational organizations (Mikkelsen, 2003).
Mikkelsen also concludes that the relations between Danish authorities and
national immigrant organizations seem to be more based on contradictions
and suspicion than the more dialogue-oriented forms in Norway (2003:
289).
Similarly, religious pluralist policies are clearly more pervasive in
Norway than in Denmark. Both countries have a constitutionally grounded
state church. In Norway, equal treatment obligations are interpreted such
that all registered communities of faith receive state support according to
memberships. All registered communities of faith can also certify marriages.
Religious schools are formally privileged as alternatives to the otherwise
dominant system of public schools, and run largely on state subsidy, and
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Norwegian anti-discrimination legislation give wide general exemption
rights to communities of faith (for a discussion, see Skjeie, 2007a).
In Denmark, there is no concurrent tradition for state sponsored
religious pluralism, and no financial support of minority religions. There is
a strong tradition of state support for private schools, called ‘free schools’,
that includes religious schools (Togeby, 2003). But the rationale behind this
policy is not tied to a promotion of religious pluralism per se, but rather
thought of as a form of ‘democratic pluralism’ Lise Togeby (2003: 154)
concludes that Danish authorities have, only to a very limited degree, shown
‘the wish and the will’ to incorporate immigrant organizations in decision-
making. In a recent comparative European study of political integration of
Islam, Denmark is actually characterized as the country with the least
official interest in developing a dialogue with its Muslim residents (Klausen,
2005).
A clear distinction can thus be drawn between the roles that religion
plays in public life in Norway and Denmark – between the active ‘religious
dialogue’ politics sought by Norwegian authorities vis-à-vis religious
minorities, and the more dismissive policies of Danish authorities. This also
implies that Norwegian authorities tend, if mainly implicitly, to distinguish
‘cultural’ from religious pluralism, and to treat claims based on the platform
of religious pluralism as mainly non-controversial also when they involve
claims to autonomy for religious groups.
INTERSECTIONS: DEBATES ABOUT RELIGIOUS DRESS
There is little doubt that ‘hijab’ represents one of the most controversial
issues concerning accommodation of religious pluralism in Europe today.
In these controversies over girls’ and women’s religious attire, a range of
liberal principles are regularly activated: state neutrality, gender equality,
religious freedom, multicultural accommodation. Controversies are played
out on a number of societal arenas: in schools, work places, public offices –
in parliaments and in courts. The issue illuminates the tensions and ambi-
guities in integration policies as well as general trends towards assimilation.
It also points towards conflicts and tensions between official discourses and
individual self-understandings, and raises questions about the meaning of
culture and the role of religion in society.
There is no way we can do justice to this complicated issue here. At the
outset, we will simply underscore the mere fact that there are no regulations
which on general grounds restrict the wearing of religious dress, or other
religious symbols, in public settings in either Denmark or Norway. This
places both countries on the liberal pole as far as regulation regimes in
Europe are concerned. Still, individual cases of hijab prohibitions,
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particularly in work places, regularly occur. Such cases have been tried
before courts and court-like bodies in both countries, as claims of religious
and/or gender based discrimination. The outcomes of these cases are,
however, different in the two countries. In Denmark, employers have been
permitted to ban the hijab. In Norway, employers who have tried this have
instead been found to have violated the Gender Equality Act and, more
recently, the new act against ethnic and religious discrimination, enacted in
2005.
The issue of restrictions has been on the public agenda for years. But while
headscarves remain a kind of fixed item, a permanent site of public
controversy in Denmark, the debate in Norway in comparison seems more ad
hoc, and generally, more subdued. In both countries, the radical right parties
have proposed restrictive regulations in parliament. But a comparison of the
framing of headscarf issues in two parliamentary proposals, which occurred
within a time span of only two months in 2004, also reveals clear differences
with regard to radical right rhetoric on the issue (Hopen Standal, 2007).
In the proposal of the Danish People’s Party, aimed to encompass all
public employees, and also pupils in elementary school3 (B201, 29.04.2004),
the headscarf is presented as ‘culturally decided’. On this basis, restrictions
are only suggested for head gear which ‘fall outside the Christian – Judean
cultural sphere’ and ‘Danish’ cultural traditions (B201:2, authors’ transla-
tion, cf. Hopen Standal, 2007:58). Examples provided by the Danish
People’s Party include the following group demarcations: ‘Turkish women’s
use of headscarves for traditional reasons’, ‘Palestinian women’s use of
headscarves for political reasons’, and ‘Somali women’s use of headscarves
for religious reasons’. In the Danish People’s Party’s proposal, the head-
scarf is mainly construed as being ‘offensive’ to the majority population, or,
as this sometimes is phrased, ‘all citizens in the Danish society’ B201:2,
authors’ translation). A distinction is further drawn between public and
private expressions of religious belonging, and religious expressions rhetor-
ically delegated to the private sphere when they breach with the dominant
tradition (see Andreassen, 2007: 39–42).
The Norwegian Progressive Party’s proposal is more vaguely formulated
with regard to the substantive content of actual bans, and is set forth within
a more general context of an ‘integration package’. The motivation under-
scores that immigrants ‘must accept the basic values which the Norwegian
society is founded on’. But the main argument is largely concentrated on
portraying forms of double victimization: On the one hand on the ‘stigma-
tization’ problematic facing young girls, particularly in school contexts,
which is ignored by parents who ‘sabotage the integration process’, on the
other hand, the religious head scarf as a symbol of ideologies of suppres-
sion and discrimination. The Progress Party cannot ‘tolerate that girls [at]
such a young age are systematically indoctrinated to accept that women are
subordinate and can be suppressed as adults’, and the headscarf works to
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exclude children from the school community when they are dressed in a
way that will “stigmatize” them’ (dok.8 : 93 (2003–2004).4 While these are
clearly polarizing statements in their own right, the distinctions drawn
between what is portrayed as the legitimate majority cultural tradition and
a contrary illegitimate minority cultural tradition still seems to be more
strongly emphasized in the Danish People Party’s rhetoric than in the
Norwegian case. The Progress Party’s concerns tend to remain with
‘oppressed’ women and girls, while the Danish People’s Party concerns
mainly concentrate on the ‘offence’ suffered by the majority population.
The explicit nationalistic theme in Danish hijab debates is, more gener-
ally, underscored in analyses of media portrayals of the headscarf. Accord-
ing to Rikke Andreassen (2005; 2007) the scarf now plays a significant role
in drawing medialized distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ when, for
instance, women from ethnic minority backgrounds are often ‘illustrated’ as
wearing the scarf, even though most women don’t. ‘The ethnic minority
woman’, wearing a headscarf, plays an important role for the construction
of the ‘ethnic Danish woman’s’ identity as already-equal-and-not-
oppressed. In such media portrayals, the scarf becomes a symbol that orga-
nizes, constructs and negotiates gender equality, nationality and identity.
Recently, the hijab has also – in extremely provocative ways – been tied
directly to issues of political representation in Demark. In April 2007, the
Leftist Party, Enhedslisten, nominated Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, who wears the
hijab, as a candidate to run for a seat in Parliament. A member of parlia-
ment for the Danish People’s Party protested her candidacy based on a
comparison of Islam with Nazism and the headscarf with the Nazi Swastika.
While most politicians opposed the statement as such, the incident led to a
political debate where several political leaders mainly used the occasion to
express personal discomforts vis-à-vis veiling in public places, while compa-
rably few saw an opportunity to underscore the importance of equal partici-
pation rights (Siim, 2007b). No similar constructions of the hijab have taken
hold across the border, in visible public debate. Here, the occasionally fierce
debates over the headscarf are largely contained within a distinct form of
gender equality frame; that is, as contestations over ‘personal autonomy’
(Gullikstad, 2007). Proponents of headscarf bans largely claim that bans will
contribute to secure personal autonomy and liberate women, while oppo-
nents correspondingly claim that bans violate women’s autonomy when
they disregard agency and independent choice. A competing frame has
mainly been presented by minority organizations when claiming that bans
foremostly reveal discriminatory attitudes and practices in society. Such
efforts might well be strengthened by the more general political approach
to religious pluralism in Norway. Generally, Norwegian public authorities
have pursued an active policy of accommodation of religious dress, and
mainly regarded this as a question of non discrimination between religions.
For instance, with respect to the wearing of religious attire in schools, the
SIIM AND SKJEIE ● TRACKS, INTERSECTIONS AND DEAD ENDS
322-344 092446 Siim (D)  22/7/08  15:53  Page 331
very existence of a Christian intention clause for educational institutions
makes it unacceptable to deny the expression of other religious beliefs,
public authorities regularly explain. Accommodating hijab thus falls into a
category of policies promoting religious pluralism, without further efforts
to elaborate on possible deeper symbolic meanings of the scarf. All in all,
it seems fair to claim that there has been modest public debate over poten-
tial religious in-group submission regimes in this respect, and that highly
critical voices are comparably few.
When human right activists and scholars debate the issue, it is mainly
framed in terms of religious choice (see for instance Høstmælingen, 2004).
Building on the ‘discrimination’ frame, minority based women’s organiz-
ations have also sought to establish a tie between the right to wear the hijab
and the right to gender equality. Here, the distinct form of gender equality
frame refers to (equal) economic independence through labour market
participation. The first hijab case brought before the Norwegian Gender
Equality Ombud, in 2004, was actually a compilation of 14 different cases
of work place bans gathered by two minority women’s organizations – the
Mira Centre and the Islamic women’s group in Norway – in cooperation
with the national, government sponsored, Centre to combat ethnic discrimi-
nation (SMED, Senter mot etnist diskriminering). These were all presented
as cases of gender discrimination under the prohibitions in the Gender
Equality Act, which at the time was the only comprehensive anti-discrimi-
nation law in place in Norway.5 The complaint resulted in a clear decision
by the Ombud that prohibitions of hijab in work places were in violation of
the ban on indirect gender discrimination (see Mile, 2004: 222). One case
was brought before the Appeals Board, which holds the decision power in
matters of continued dispute. A large hotel in the Oslo area had practised
an employee uniform code which the hotel management claimed was not
reconcilable with the use of head coverings. The appeals board agreed with
the Ombud in her evaluation that this prohibition mainly would have
negative consequences for women employees using hijab. The uniform code
– although gender neutral in wording – could thus be seen to produce
gender-specific discriminatory effects. In determining this, the Ombud also
compared such restrictions to the contrary, accommodating, uniform regu-
lations within the military services (i.e. turbans). She reasoned that many
Muslim women wear the hijab because of religious reasons and that it is
thus a part of their personal integrity and that situations may well occur
where they could not accept to work if they could not use the headscarf. A
prohibition would thus entail significant disadvantages for these women (cf.
Craig, 2006). In two more recent decisions, the Ombud has upheld this
general line of reasoning. In the latest one, a hijab ban was tried both
according to the Gender Equality Act and the new act against ethnic and
religious discrimination (2005), and the ban found in violation on both
prohibition grounds.
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This series of judgements by the Norwegian Ombud are important not
least because they specifically address hijab as an issue of individual gender
equality rights in ways which challenge the ‘crisis’ frame, and which also
contribute to ‘normalizing’ the whole headscarf issue. The Ombud explic-
itly refrains from considerations about subjugate symbolic meanings of the
scarf, and instead treats the complex as an intersecting individual right. In
this, the decisions also run counter to the generals statements made by, for
instance, the European Court of Human Rights, in the Dahlab and Sahin
headscarf cases, where the court takes special pains to repeat respectively
the Swiss and Turkish states’ notions that the wearing of a headscarf ‘seems
hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality’ (cf. Skjeie, 2007b)
In Denmark, there is no similar Ombud institution in charge of supervis-
ing anti-discrimination legislation. Individual complaints, mainly about
religious discrimination, have here been handled by the regular court
system. The courts have disagreed in rulings on different cases, but recently,
the Supreme Court has upheld a right for employers to adopt uniform codes
which prevent the use of the hijab. We will briefly outline two of the Danish
cases, where conclusions are contradictory in terms of employers’ right to
ban religious dress at work. The first case was raised in 1998 by a young
Muslim girl who wanted to do an internship in a big department store as
part of her school education. The employer sent her home, because she
would not take off her headscarf which she stated she wore for religious
reasons. The court found the ban on headscarves to be an indirect discrimi-
nation towards a specific religious group (Hansen, 2003; 243). The sentence
led several large chain stores to change their previous practice of not hiring
veiled women. But then the seminal Føtex case came, in 2003. Najla Ainouz
had been employed in a department store chain Føtex for five years when
she decided to wear a headscarf. The employer argued that she did not live
up to the general dress code of the supermarket, which demanded that
employees had to be ‘professionally and nicely dressed’. Her trade union
argued that she was the victim of indirect discrimination. In 2003 the court
acquitted Føtex and ruled that the dismissal was legal due to the the super-
market’s general uniform code. The sentence was appealed and the case was
taken to the Supreme Court, which confirmed the decision in January 2005.
The final court decision was a surprise to human rights lawyers. The
previous court case had ruled in favour of indirect discrimination in relation
to the Law Against Discriminatory Behaviour on the Labour market (from
1996), whereas the rulings in the Føtex case mainly upheld the right of the
employers to decide the dress code (Andreassen, 2007).
The Norwegian Ombud’s reasoning on headscarves as intersecting
gender equality rights is unambiguously in line with both the reasoning and
collective actions of minority women’s organizations and government
sponsored agencies on the issue. It could, actually, be seen as an exemplary
case of minority driven and – sensitive state feminism in action. The Danish
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courts’ reasonings represent a more traditional judicial ‘balancing act’ of
individual religious rights on the one hand, and employers’ rights on the
other. Comparatively speaking, the right to wear the hijab is thus clearly
better protected in Norwegian than in Danish judicial practice.
It is indeed remarkable how differently the popular, political and legal
discourses are played out in the two countries. The headscarf issue is clearly
more controversial in Denmark, where it is regularly framed as being juxta-
posed to ‘Danish’ majority culture, values, and traditions. In Norway, the
hijab issue is more regularly treated both as an integral part of official
religious pluralist policies and an issue of intersecting religious and gender
equality rights. General public sentiment is not in favour of liberal policies,
as a series of public opinion polls reveal. But in policy formation processes
on the hijab it seems that minority based interests have contributed more
strongly to shape the discourse. In this respect, it is probably also import-
ant that no divisive public conflict has appeared between feminist voices
and voices from the mosque.
DEAD ENDS: GENDER AND IMMIGRATION
In both Denmark and Norway, the serious challenge of how to combat
forced marriages has been equally prominent on public agendas for more
than a decade. To force someone into marriage is a clear human rights
violation, which states have a similarly clear obligation to try to prevent.
Young people who risk being forced into marriage against their will also
have special protection needs: many have changed their names and live in
secret addresses to avoid being forced to marry or face sanctions after
having run away from home to escape.
Anja Bredal (2005) has, in great detail, outlined important similarities,
as well as differences, in Nordic policy approaches to combat forced
marriages. Important to a comparison of respectively Norwegian and
Danish policies, is the particular strong focus in Denmark on seeing
marriage as a strategy for immigration. Policy development is marked by a
generalization from individual cases of forced marriage to the marriage
practices of whole minority groups, where distinctions between arranged
and forced marriages are blurred, and both practices tend to be regarded
as equally unacceptable.
In both countries, there is a general development towards a tightening of
border controls, and new restrictions on family unification, as a means to
combat forced marriages. This in turn implies a strengthened focus on how
international human rights obligations actually are balanced in national
legislation on immigration. But in Denmark, as Bredal (2005) notes, the
dominant policy strategy to combat forced marriage was from the start
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concentrated on efforts to restrict the right to family unification with a
spouse from abroad. Over the years, this has been linked to a more general
development toward what is now referred to as one, if not the, strictest
immigration policy in Europe (Grøndahl, 2003). In 2000 the coalition
parties of Social Democrats and Liberal Centre adopted special rules to
prevent forced marriages between young Danish and foreign citizens
(Grøndahl 2003: 188–189).6 The present Liberal Conservative government
dramatically tightened the right to family reunification in 2002 by adopting
a mandatory age of 24 for couples wanting to marry a foreign citizen and
by extending the obligation to economic self-sufficiency. The law also
provided that couples had to prove that their connection to Denmark was
stronger than their connection to any other country [‘tilknytningskravet’]
in order to be allowed to unite in Denmark.7 The opposition has generally
supported this change, provided it was not in conflict with Denmark’s obli-
gations according to international conventions. It is contested whether
Danish immigration legislation actually lives up to the relevant conventions.
The legislation has been criticized by the Danish Institute for Human
Rights (2004) for the violation of the right to family life8 (the European
Convention of Human Rights, article 8), by the CEDAW committee in 2002,
and more recently by the Report of the Council of Europe’s Commissioner
on Human Rights. This report was followed by a political debate between
the government and the opposition in the summer of 2004, where the oppo-
sition demanded that the administration of the Integration law should be
according to the rules of ECHR (Siim, 2007a).
In Norway, the policy discourse has traditionally been marked by
applying a more consistent distinction between arranged marriages and use
of force. The first of a series of governmental action plans on forced
marriages, published in 1998, discussed at length such distinctions.9 Import-
ant was also the plan’s stress on the need to engage in dialogue with relevant
minority groups, as well as securing assistance to those who fear or have
been victims of forced marriage. The plan can largely be described as a ‘civil
society’ oriented effort; as it prioritized support for organisations working
with young people in crisis situations; the Women’s shelter movement and
the Red Cross among others. As Bredal observes, the most striking aspect
of this plan was possibly its remarkably short section on legal regulations.
No mention was made of using stricter immigration laws to fight forced
transnational marriages. Rather, the only law-based action appeared,
according to Bredal (2005), to suggest a liberal immigration practice, as the
Action Plan stated that the authorities will ‘investigate the possibilities for
continued residence in Norway after the marriage annulment’.
However, when the Norwegian government in 2002 issued a ‘Renewed
Initiative against Forced Marriage’,10 ten of a total of 30 new measures were
now law-related punitive actions. The Marriage Act already held a special
provision for the annulment of forced marriages, and allows either of the
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spouses to bring civil action against the other in order to have their
marriage annulled, if he or she has been forced into the marriage. Forced
marriage has also been illegal according to the general provisions of the
General Civil Penal Code on illegal use of force. This provision was now
amended to include a specific subsection on forced marriage. According to
this provision, both the spouse and/or the family members involved in
organizing the forced marriage can be charged, and risk imprisonment for
up to six years, and a mandatory prosecution clause was introduced in cases
of forced marriage so that the perpetrators may be prosecuted without the
victim’s consent. This mirrored the mandatory public prosecution provision
regarding domestic violence cases, instituted in 1988. Notably however, the
package of new state initiatives to combat forced marriages was kept strictly
apart from the activities of the group which, by government appointment,
and at roughly the same time, prepared a report on violence against women.
This latter report documented the situation of women exposed to violence
from a present or former partner, and made recommendations on policies
and measures aimed both at improving the situation of victims and prevent-
ing violence against women (NOU, 2003:31).
Contrary to the Norwegian governmental plans, the Danish Govern-
ment’s Action Plan for 2003–200511 addresses both ‘Forced, Quasi-forced
and Arranged Marriages’. The initiative states that the overall objective of
political interventions is not only to prevent marriages that involve force,
which is against the law, but also to prevent all forms of arranged marriages,
including marriage between cousins. The document stresses that forced
and arranged marriages have the same negative effects in relation to self-
determination, cultural conflicts, and lack of integration. References to both
the Norwegian and British Action Plans against Forced Marriages, to the
Human Rights Convention of 1948 and the Danish law against forced
marriage, helped to blur differences between forced and arranged
marriages. The document thus identifies the main problem as a value
conflict and a clash of culture between the Danish majority norms of gender
equality and the cultural tradition of forced and arranged marriages that
lead to oppression and lack of self-determination for minority women
(Siim, 2007a).
In Norway as well, references to the state’s obligation to prevent forced
marriages have more recently given rise to proposals about stricter immi-
gration regulations for family reunification. The public commission, which
drafted a new Aliens Act in 2004, also launched a proposal about a 21 year
age limit for family reunification, partly modelled on the Danish ‘24 year’
rule. Since then, controversy has raged. In the autumn of 2006, the new left
coalition government issued a public hearing of ‘additional demands’ to a
possible 21 year limit, which specified a series of measures aimed at prevent-
ing situations where young people were forced to leave the country to
marry, and forcefully held in this country until the age of 21. However, this
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public hearing mainly demonstrated the extent of opposition among
organizations in civil society against the intertwining of policies against
forced marriages and a stricter immigration regime (Skjeie and Teigen,
2007). As a number of organizations pointed out, a ‘21 year rule’ could not
distinguish between forced and other marriages, and was thus quite mean-
ingless as a targeted effort to combat the first. Such regulations would
mainly contribute to a stigmatization of immigrant groups. Some organiz-
ations also maintained that it represented an unacceptable threat towards
the right to family life. Minority-political organizations were furious, and
supported in their protests by most of the large humanitarian organizations
and the anti-discrimination and human rights institutes. Actually, on the
basis of this hearing the government backed down. It risked compromising
the whole institute of public hearings – which otherwise is so central to the
‘participatory corporatism’ of Norwegian social democratic traditions. The
restriction attempt had been pushed by the social democratic party – one
of three coalition partners – and it clearly helped the organizations’ cause
that the two other parties within the government were hesitant on this issue.
In the Norwegian context, it also seems fair to argue that the original
distinction between forced and arranged marriages has contributed to
prevent issues of women’s rights from turning into issues of border control.
Here only one minority-political organization stands out as instrumental in
the maintenance of this focus on abuse of women within minority groups
as an immigration problem. This is the private foundation Human Rights
Service (HRS), which calls itself a think-tank on integration issues with a
particular focus on ‘the rights of women and children – and on such
violations of those rights as forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and
honour killings’ (cited in Bredal, 2005).12 HRS has consistently sought to
influence state policies to combat practices of forced marriage, and
campaigned for the tightening of immigration controls as a major strategy.
Their proposals have in particular been taken up and presented in Parlia-
ment by the Progress Party, which has also been instrumental in securing
funds directly from the state budget to HRS. Interestingly, the organization
has also served as advisor to the Danish minister in charge of immigration
and integration policies (information provided by Bredal, 2005). It has in
this respect been clearly more successful in Denmark.
The Danish debate about forced and arranged marriages cannot solely
be interpreted as expressions of a ‘clashes of cultures’ theme where ‘patri-
archal’ and ‘modern’ family forms collide. But it seems to build on clearly
stated conflicts between an individualistic family tradition and practice and
the more collective family orientations of many migrant groups. There is no
doubt that the restrictive immigration/integration legislation has created a
strong pressure towards cultural assimilation that has contributed to exac-
erbate conflicts between minority and majority groups about cultural values
connected with family forms and gender roles. From this perspective, the
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linkage of national values to a gender equality model based upon a dual
breadwinner and highly individualist family model has contributed to make
the issue of forced and arranged marriages an arena for acute political-
cultural conflicts between the majority and minority (Siim, 2007a).
In Norway, a recent investigation of participation structures in two public
hearings of new policy initiatives to combat forced marriages shows that
public authorities clearly strive to include in particular the most visible,
although very few, national minority women’s organizations. They do not
however, to the same extent, make efforts to include organizations within
the women’s movement per se. Nor, for that matter, do these organizations
demand to be included. This way, participation in public hearings reinforces
current divides between ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ gender equality policies
(Skjeie and Teigen, 2007).
CONCLUSION: STATE FEMINISM REVISITED
‘State feminism’ highlights the similarities of Scandinavian gender equality
regimes in relation to women’s labour market participation, access to public
childcare and political participation and representation. As outlined in the
introduction, state feminism’s original formulations depict an inclusion
dynamic where mobilization ‘from below’ combines with ‘integration
politics from above’ to create state policies where rights’ expansion and
institutional presence are two sides of the same coin. In multicultural terms,
state feminism has by no means fulfilled its promises. Rather, the gap seems
wide between the will to promote institutional political presence and the
will to initiate public policies. Majority based viewpoints combine with
exclusive whiteness in core political institutions. Here a new public agenda
is fast developing, but with limited scope and an inherent tendency to
divide ‘gender equality’ into respectively ‘minority group’ and ‘majority’
concerns.
The minority group agenda is clearly influenced by the radical right’s
recent appropriation of gender equality concerns. We agree with Akkerman
and Hagelunds’ (2007) observation that the discourse on gender has helped
to legitimate a shift away from multiculturalism among left parties, while
providing a potentially respectable anti-immigration position for radical
right parties. Within the confines of the ‘crisis’ frame, the radical right can
defend liberal values of individualism, human rights and gender equality in
blatantly monoculturalist terms. This frame is not challenged in any system-
atic way either by left parties or by the feminist movements, which often,
in both Norway and Denmark, are marked by divisions and lack of
institutional bridges between traditionally majority based organizations
and new minority based organizations. From this, it seems clear that
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multiculturalism poses specific problems for Nordic state feminism when it
comes to recognizing cultural diversity in general, and to accepting
different models of gender equality and the family in particular. Obviously,
the dilemma between multiculturalism and the rights of immigrant groups
on the one hand, and state feminism and the rights of woman on the other
hand, are a contextual conflict. However, a kind of ‘sobering moment’ in
times of such conflict is also offered when we consider the treatment of the
religious headscarf in Norwegian judicial, state, and minority based
political practice.
But the very formula of ‘state feminism’ will anyhow collapse if and when
the dynamic is unbalanced – i.e. when the participatory dimension, and
‘mobilization from below’, yields to the policy making dimension and
‘integration from above’. As an inclusion dynamic, state feminism is today
challenged from two sides – from the fragmentation of the feminist
movement, as well as from the general, relative, political marginalization of
immigrant groups. In both Norway and Denmark it is possible to identify
what we will call a ‘gender equality paradox’, which refers to the simulta-
neous inclusion of women from ethnic majority backgrounds and exclusion
of women from ethnic minority backgrounds in core political institutions
such as parliament and government. Access to the other ‘standard channel’
to influence and power, the corporate decision making structure, is also
limping. Here, integration ‘schemes’ concentrate on limited, ad hoc, involve-
ment of organized interests, while paying little attention to individually
based access to boards and commissions.
Overall, we regard the limited access for minority backgrounds, interests
and viewpoints on the public sites where policies are formalized and sanc-
tioned as a serious political challenge. But this general charge also conceals
some important differences with regard to substantive policy formation
processes in the two countries under consideration here.
The current lack of broad and integrative gender equality perspectives
formulated ‘from below’ is probably most problematic in the Danish case,
which traditionally has relied more on grass roots mobilization. Here,
traditional gender equality politics has waned from public agendas, to be
replaced by a highly selective minority gender equality politics primarily
targeting immigrant communities. In the Norwegian case, a continued
political ambition to expand gender balance politics has not been combined
with similarly eager efforts to include minority based locations, voices and
points of views in core decision making bodies. At the same time, while
public authorities may take special pains to include the comparably few
national minority women’s NGOs in public commissions and/or hearings
when ‘crisis prevention’ schemes are to be developed, no similar efforts are
made to include the traditional feminist organizations in these. In this way,
a somewhat differently construed divide between ‘minority group’ and
‘majority’ concerns is also developing in Norway.
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The divergent ‘solutions’ on the two policy issues examined in this paper,
policies to combat forced marriages, and debates about the hijab, still show
how a stronger corporatist tradition in Norway actually has contributed to
shape the policy formation options. The combined effort of minority politi-
cal organizations, social and humanitarian NGOs, and anti-discrimination
agencies protesting the introduction of a ‘21 year’ rule for family unification,
is one example. The framing of hijab in the Norwegian context, as an issue
of intersectional religious and gender equality rights, is another. Here both
minority organizations and human right agencies have fought hard to claim
hijab bans as proof of discriminatory attitudes in society, and received
support in this framing through the rulings of the Gender Equality Ombud.
How, then, may public agencies intervene effectively against practices
that are harmful to women, without in the process demonizing minority
groups? This question looms large also on the agenda of this special issue
of Ethnicities on the rights of women and the crisis of multiculturalism.
From a normative democratic perspective, we would argue that proactive
public strategies must combine with civil society measures, which enable a
just recognition of the relevant distinctions between different cultural and
religious practices. Pragmatically, we would point to the political-judicial
resolution of ‘headscarf’ conflicts in Norway as a ‘best practice’ example in
this respect. The state has a clear obligation to protect and further individ-
ual human rights. Self evidently, this also includes the right to participation
and voice. From this double obligation follows a specific challenge for the
state: to work hard to facilitate participation; to put much more institutional
energy into the inventive development of participatory schemes, so that
all who are affected by political decisions are equally included in their
making.
Notes
1 For instance, the Norwegian Progress Party, which is an ardent defender of state
intervention to secure women’s rights in immigrant family relationships, also
thinks that the Gender Equality Act should be abolished and the Ombud insti-
tution put to rest, as relationships between men and women should develop
naturally and without state intervention. This point is elaborated by Akkerman
and Hagelund (2007) in a comparison of Norwegian and Dutch radical right
policy and rhetoric.
2 KIM: Kontaktutvalget mellom innvandrerbefolkningen og myndighetene.
3 Folketinget: http://www.folketinget.dk/. Samling: 2003-04-B201 Lovforslag om
forbud mod tørklæder: (B201 Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning om forbud mod
at bære kulturbestemt hovedbeklædning). URL: http://www.folketinget.dk/
samling/20031/salen/B201_BEHI_98:6_(NB).html. For links to the Dansih
debate about the headscarves see the homepage for the VEIL project ‘Values,
Equity and Differences in Liberal Democracies. Debates about Muslim
Women’s Headscarves in Europe’ (http://veil-project.eu).
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4 Dokument nr. 8: 93 (2003–2004): Privat forslag fra stortingsrepresentantene
Carl. I.  Hagen, Per Sandberg, Arne Sortevik og Karin S. Woldseth (Private bill
proposal from Members of Parliament Carl. I. Hagen, Per Sandberg, Arne
Sortevik and Karin S. Woldseth). URL: http://www.stortinget.no/dok8/2003/
dok8-200304-093.html
5 A general prohibition of ethnic and religious discrimination was not put into
force in Norway until 2006.
6 One was ‘the attachment’ rule – that couples must have an attachment to
Denmark at least as strong as that to any other country. Another was the
obligation for the person living in Denmark to have a ‘home of a reasonable
size’.
7 This requirement does not apply to family unification if the spouse is a citizen
in a European country. EU citizens have the right to move freely within the
territory of another member state, when the purpose is to apply for employ-
ment, according to article 39 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (EC).
8 Family-unification has become politicized and there is now an EU Directive on
Family Unification from Third country nationals (Council Directive 2003/86/
EC). As a result of the Danish adoption of four reservations to the Mastricht
Treaty – the EURO, the European army, EU citizenship and legal and interior
matters – Denmark is allowed to have stricter rules concerning family-
unification than other member-states are allowed to have according to EU
Directive 2003/86 on family-unification. The ‘24 year provision’ in the Danish
Alien Act §9 is therefore a European exception. http://www.europakommissionen.
dk/eupolitik/noegleomraader/juridiske_menneskeret/familiesammenfoering/.
Direktive om ret til familiesammenføring, 22 September 2003.
9 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/dok/rapporter_planer/planer/2001/Hand
lingsplan-mot-tvangsekteskap.html?id=276888
10 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/tema/andre/Tvangsekteskap/Forneyet-
innsats-mot-tvangsekteskap-varen.html?id=417218
11 Handlingsplan for regeringens indsats I perioden 2003–2005 mod tvangsægtesk-
aber, tvangslignende ægteskaber og arrangerede ægteskaber, 15 August 2003.
http://www.lige.dk/Files/PDF/handlingsplan_tvang.pdf
12 HRS has also been a fierce proponent of headscarf bans and a very active
participant in attempts to frame the headscarf as an expression of (an intolera-
ble) subjugation of women and girls. See for instance Storhaug, 2007.
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